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Abstract
Since 1965, the United States Air Force has relied on mathematical programming for the
planning of conventional air-to-ground munitions. The centerpiece of this planning effort is
HEAVY ATTACK, a theater-level model employing large-scale nonlinear programming to
load weapons onto aircraft and assign sorties to targets. The single-period objective is to
maximize the expected destroyed target value over the forecast weather states by assigning
sorties which use the best delivery tactics in each weather state with available aircraft
and weapons stocks. Over multiple periods, HEAVY ATTACK accounts for differences
between targets in regeneration rate, value, and ease of damage assessment, and accounts
for aircraft attrition and remaining weapons stocks, mounting the best sorties possible with
the remaining resources. In 1988 approximately S2 billion worth of weapons were purchased
with guidance from HEAVY ATTACK; additional expenditures of $5.2 billion are being
planned for 1994-99.
In 1990-91, media coverage of Desert Storm made the focus of HEAVY ATTACK ap-
parent to millions of viewers.
As many arrows, loosed several ways, ...
so may a thousand actions, once afoot,




The United States Air Force (USAF) bases its air-to-ground munitions planning on the pro-
jected need for weapons in fighting a protracted war. Sufficient stocks of such weapons must
be in place in, or transportable to, a theater of operations for timely use in combat. In order
to determine the required stores of such weapons, some evaluation of their use in hypothesized
theater-level conflict is required.
Over the past 25 years, the USAF has pioneered in the modeling and optimization of the end
effects of the procurement, stockpiling, and combat use of conventional air-to-ground munitions;
the goal is to provide guidance credible to military planners, to the Legislative and Executive
branches of the U.S. Government, and, ultimately, to U.S. taxpayers. USAF is unique amongst
the military services in the extent to which it relies on mathematical programming to accomplish
this. In 1988 approximately $2 billion worth of weapons were purchased, and expenditures of
$5.2 billion are already planned for 1994-99 (e.g., Department of Defense [1993]) with guidance
from HEAVY ATTACK, the main subject of this paper, one of the major applications of
mathematical programming in the United States. In this article we review the history of the
system, describe its current use. and project near-term enhancements based on current research.
2 Background
The USAF is interested in optimization because aircraft are flexible weapon systems; depending
on how an aircraft is loaded with weapons, it can more or less efficiently attack a variety
of targets. Given a collection of several types of aircraft (say Oj aircraft sorties of type i;
? = 1 A) to be used in attacking a collection of targets (say tj targets of type j, j — 1 T),
the problem of assigning aircraft to targets naturally arises. Perhaps the simplest formulation
of the problem would be to let EXJ be the average number of targets of type j killed by a sortie of








s.t. ^£"j;xv =y; ;;' = 1 T
T
]T Xij < a, ;?' = 1 A
Xij > 0,
where y, (a variable) is the average number of targets of type j killed and Vj (an input) is
the subjectively-assessed value of a target of type j. The meaning of the objective function is
"average value of targets killed"
.
Although (LPl) is a good starting point for this exposition, USAF has not to our knowledge
ever actually used it. The difficulty is that solutions to such formulations tend to be very
extreme in nature. Each aircraft type is entirely assigned to a single target type (i is assigned
to j if j maximizes VjEXJ )\ it is even conceivable that all aircraft types might be assigned to
the same target type. Although this kind of solution might be reasonable in a target-rich
environment where sorties are hopelessly outnumbered by targets, it is neither realistic nor
acceptable in genera], even merely for planning purposes.
There are two direct methods of embellishing (LPl) so that the solutions are not so extreme.
The simpler is to add the constraints y-. < tj (note that (LPl) does not involve the data tj at
all) to prevent the possibility of killing more targets on average than are known to exist. Call
the resulting linear program (LP2). In (LP2), sorties may be assigned to targets other than
their favorite type if the favorite type is exhausted. The Theater Attack Model (TAM) discussed
by Might [1987] is a linear generalization of (LP2) where variables have additional subscripts
corresponding to weather, weapons, etc., so descendents of (LP2) are well-represented amongst
contemporary military planning models. However, even though (LP2) accomplishes the goal
of cutting off the extreme solutions while introducing minimal complication to (LPl), it wa^
not the method originally chosen by USAF.
The other direct method of fixing (LPl) is to make the objective function nonlinear to
reflect the idea of decreasing returns as y; is increased. An early USAF model, SABER MIX.






This objective function might be justified by arguing that the "fog of war" will cause the
statistics of the number of times a particular target of type j is killed (say, Xj) to obey the
Poisson distribution (Blacken [1962]). Since the expected value of Xj is y; // ; , it follows from
the Poisson assumption that the probability that any target of type j is not killed is
P(Xj = 0)=exp(-yj /tj ).
Equation (2) then follows directly. The objective function still has the meaning "average value
of targets killed"', just as in (LPl) and (LP2). Of course the new mathematical program (call
it (NLPl)) is of a more difficult type; the constraints are linear, but the objective function is
not.
Since 1 — exp(— x) < x for x > 0, (NLPl) will always have a smaller optimized objec-
tive function than (LP2). (LP2) essentially incorporates the assumption that sorties can be
coordinated so that targets that have already been killed will not be further attacked. This
kind of coordination is assumed to be impossible in (NLPl), with the attendant possibility of
wastage due to overkill. The two programs correspond to extreme assumptions about the kind
of command and control that can be exercised in battle.
(NLPl) was a nontrivial optimization problem when it was formulated in the 1960's. An
early attempt at a solution involved the assumption that all targets were to be attacked by
one aircraft type. This problem has the same mathematical form as the corresponding Search
Theory problem of allocating random search effort to a collection of cells (Charnes and Cooper
[1958]), so an efficient solution technique was available by the time the Munitions Planning
Branch was formed. However, there were obvious problems with assigning each aircraft type as
if none of the others existed, so the desirability of solving the joint optimization problem where
all aircraft types are considered simultaneously was quickly recognized.
In the early 1970's, the Directorate of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation (DDPA&E)
funded a mathematical programming-based scheme for assigning aircraft to targets that incor-
porated the best features of SABER MIX and two other systems that were then in use. The
resulting formulation (NLP2) is reported in Clasen, Graves, and Lu [1974]. The (NLP2) ob-






; y; /r ; ))/c; (3)
Note that (3) is the same as (2) if c} = 1, and that (3) is the same as (1) in the limit as
Cj approaches 0. The parameter c
;
thus bridges the situation where command and control is
impossible (the Poisson case c
;
= 1) and where it is perfect (the linear case where c; approaches
0). However, a precise meaning for c
;
has never been given. Clasen, Graves, and Lu say only
that "DDPA&E suggested this function to us. It is similar to the objective function of the
SABER MIX methodology." The lack of a physical meaning has proven to be troublesome
for subsequent generations of USAF officers (see Section 4) required to estimate Cj for various
classes of targets, and various levels of engagement "fog" in the theater.
(NLP2) also incorporates constraints on y; that ensure that not more than tj targets of
type j are killed, on the average. Thus (LP2) and (NLPl) are both special cases.
3 HEAVY ATTACK
The HEAVY ATTACK model currently in use by the USAF Weapons Division is still, at
its heart, the Clasen, Graves, and Lu model (NLP2), but now larger and embellished with
additional types of linear constraints. HEAVY ATTACK considers a sequence of allocation
problems, with each problem corresponding to one time period in a war that is projected to be
several time periods long. Targets that survive the attacks of one period are still available in
the next, together with reinforcements and also with targets that were killed in previous periods
but have since been repaired (reconstituted), possibly with different values. The optimization is
done myopically, with the objective in each period being to kill as much target value as possible
without regard to the effect on future periods. The myopic feature Is analytically convenient,
since it permits the analysis of a sequence of small problems rather than one large one, but it
is also realistic in the sense that the actual policy for assigning aircraft to targets (which must
be distinguished from the value-based method in HEAVY ATTACK) is a joint-service process
that does not include the idea of "saving targets for the future". There may be an element of
making virtue out of what was once a necessity here, but still that is the justification usually
given for myopia.
HEAVY ATTACK depends on a separate program, SELECTOR, for the sortie effective-
ness inputs Eij. SELECTOR is needed not because effectiveness coefficients would otherwise
be lacking, but rather because there are too many of them. The Joint Munitions Effective-
ness Manual (JMEM, e.g. Joint Technical Coordinating Group/Munitions Effectiveness [1980])
shows how to tabulate
Eijtw = average number of targets of type j killed by a sortie of type i
using tactic t in weather type w.
SELECTOR'S role is essentially to get rid of the last two subscripts. The method for doing this is
important, since it is often the case that the most effective tactics are associated with expensive
munitions or high attrition to the delivering aircraft. SELECTOR adopts only the most cost-
effective tactic: literally the tactic that maximizes the ratio of sortie cost (including the cost
of weapons used and expected attrition) to EXJtXL,. Let this tactic be t*(i,j,w), and let E1JU , be
the effectiveness when that tactic is used. The coefficients EX} required by HEAVY ATTACK
are obtained by simply averaging £,; .u, over whatever weather distribution is appropriate in the
area of the supposed conflict; the natural notation would be EtJ .., but we will drop the two dots
to be coasistent with earlier usage.
The inputs to HEAVY ATTACK are determined once each year for each potential theater of
operations. The Weapons Division hosts an annual theater planning session attended by mid-
level operational, intelligence, logistics, and planning staff officers. The goal is to produce a
realistic current requirement for theater weapons stocks. Attendees must travel great distances
to participate in these sessions, and can only be expected to remain briefly in residence before
returning to exigent duty. Cadre analysts (e.g., Coulter) are responsible for care and feeding
of HEAVY ATTACK, and thus must interpret the proposals of the theater planning group and
endeavor to provide compelling scenarios for their evaluation.
Once HEAVY ATTACK has determined sortie-to-target allocations for each period of the
war, munition requirements can be recovered by recalling the function t'(i y j.w) determined by
SELECTOR and doing the appropriate accounting. The resulting estimates of theater weapons
stocks requirements are used to justify the aggregate USAF annual weapons buy request. These
budget requests are exposed to exhaustive scrutiny by L:SAF, and subsequently by other levels
of review. Budget revisions by higher authority are reconciled with mission requirements with
the help of HEAVY ATTACK.
4 Embellishments
HEAVY ATTACK as first formulated by Clasen, Craves, and Lu in 197-4 was a nonlinear pro-
gram with at most 10 sortie types and 45 target types; even with their new method, solving
problems of that size required quite a while on contemporary computers. Enriching the model
in any manner that would have increased run times was out of the question, however nervous its
users might have been about such things as the SELECTOR/HEAVY ATTACK system's my-
opic approach to optimization over time, fractional sortie assignments, and the suboptimization
implicit in SELECTOR'S preprocessing of the JMEM effectiveness data.
However, computers and computer software have improved substantially since 1974. Lord
[1982] reports mainframe solution times measured in seconds, rather than minutes, upon
completing the installation of the X-system solver (e.g., Brown and Olson [1992]). Bausch
and Brown [1988] describe a prototypic implementation of HEAVY ATTACK on an 80386-
based IBM-compatible microcomputer, an uncommon feat at the time. In 1991 more power-
ful 80486 machines were configured for production use in various environments, implemented
with mainframe-compatible software (Silicon Valley Software [1991]), and shipped to users as
HEAVY ATTACK machines. Wallace [1992] exploits this new capability by designing and im-
plementing a prototypic graphical user interface (GUI) which is especially useful for comparing
outputs from multiple scenarios. Bradley, et al. [1992] give an unclassified demonstration of
this unified hardware and software decision support system: sortie optimization for 25 aircraft
types, 90 weapon types, and 100 target types, problems with hundreds of constraints and thou-
sands of variables for each of 6 time periods, requires about two minutes from SELECTOR
input to final output. Washburn [1989] describes a new method tailored to the HEAVY AT-
TACK problem that solves (NLP2) with 13 sortie types and 61 target types in about two
seconds on an 80386 machine. Plainly, the computation time considerations that drove the
original (NLP2) formulation have now been substantially relaxed, to the point where more
computationally stressful reformulations can be considered.
However, SELECTOR/HEAVY ATTACK'S long and successful lifetime as a planning tool
makes it difficult to consider any substantial reformulation, even now that computational cost
is negligible. Generations of Air Force officers have learned to cope with the idiosyncrasies,
assumptions, and data requirements. Inter-organizational relationships have evolved to provide
inputs and interpret outputs. "If it ain't broke don't fix it. "
So the Weapons Division is naturally attracted most by changes that merely affect compu-
tational efficiency or ease of use. For example, linear side coastraints can now be used to insure
flyable mixtures of sorties. Graphical user interfaces are expensive to design and develop, but
are invaluable for quick, reliable formulation of input scenarios and interpretation of their out-
put. Further, although HEAVY ATTACK can run on many hardware platforms, and employs
the fastest large-scale optimizer in our experience, a 486 PC Is now the favored host due to its
low cost, convenience, and portability.
Less favored, but sometimes essential, are changes that produce the same output quantities
from the same input quantities. For example, a variety of changes have been made to the target
reconstitution model. These changes do not require new inputs nor change the meaning of the
outputs, although the output quantities are of course affected.
Least favored are reformulations that require an essentially different way of looking at
things. Recently, constraints on weapon usage by period have been added. The basic idea
of SELECTOR/HEAVY ATTACK is to buy whatever weapons are required to fight a cost-
effective war, so it would seem illogical to include constraints on the usage of a particular
weapon. The trouble is that certain weapons (AGM-65A/B Maverick air-to-ground missiles,
for example) are no longer in production but still quite effective. The only realistic way to
handle such weapons is to constrain their usage to the size of the current stockpile.
Note that the current system includes no budget constraints, even though it is a principally
budgetary tool. SELECTOR utilizes cost inputs in determining the most cost-effective tactic,
but weapon usage is not actually constrained by any budget. The HEAVY ATTACK output
can therefore be interpreted as the classic military "requirements" for weapons with some
implied budget level B. The idea that B should be an input, rather than an output, requires
a fundamentally different view of the problem.
We continue to pursue enhancements and reformulations. Boger and Washburn [1985] de-
scribe an alternate nonlinear objective function where the parameter c
;
has a physical inter-
pretation. They also describe how the organization of computations in SELECTOR could lead
to overutilization of weather-specialized weapons and weather-robust aircraft. Wirths [1989]
develops several prototypic reformulations using the GAMS/MINOS system (e.g., Murtagh and
Saunders [1984], Brooke, et ah [1992]). Amongst other things he shows that the impact of using
a linear objective function is not as great as had previously been thought, and that the myopic
approach to optimization over time is possibly of more concern. Utilizing a linear objective
function would of course open up a great many other possibilities for reformulation, including
the adoption of the conceptually simpler, but larger TAM (Might [1987]), which includes sub-
scripts for weapons, weather, and, according to Jackson [1988], distance and time period too.
However, TAM utilizes budget constraints, and our computational experience with TAM, as
well as that of Jackson [1988], shows that it is very time consuming to solve in spite of its linear
objective function.
At this writing in early 1993, theater conferences have just been completed for the first time
without requiring the physical attendance of the theater planners.
5 Conclusion
We chose HEAVY ATTACK for this expository paper for some reasons not yet discussed.
HEAVY ATTACK has for some time been a favorite classroom example at the Naval Post-
graduate School. HEAVY ATTACK is simple to explain and understand without resorting
to excessive mathematics, can be used in hands-on homework and modified for experiments
by students, yet exhibits all the features, man-machine interaction, and richness a decision
support system should have. The system has been in use for many years, and its remarkable
longevity and direct influence on billion-dollar decisions automatically enhance student interest
and warrant study of its design and application. Even Issues of client and analyst psychol-
ogy, the influence of politics on decision making, and techniques for run-to-run comparison of
optimized results can be highlighted. Being a nonlinear optimization model, it also provides
rich collateral mathematical material such as characterization of concavity, numerical analysis,
function approximation, aggregation, and proofs of convergence.
When the problem description for HEAVY ATTACK is given as a homework formulation
exercise, students immediately construct detailed linear models: we call this approach the
"Xsubscrxptjoreverything" method. Asked to provide answers to the problem under time pressure,
students quickly discover the large size and data appetite of their models, and devise reasonable
aggregation strategies sometimes reminiscent of HEAVY ATTACK. Required to interpret their
answers to this problem, students face many of the paradoxes inherent in modeling.
HEAVY ATTACK is an important member of a standard set of models we use to test
new optimization techniques. The fact that we have always maintained nonlinear optimization
capability in all our systems has derived in part from consideration of this application. We admit
some professional satisfaction that HEAVY ATTACK has evolved, with many cohort models,
from a daunting computational feat to a keystroke-quick application, even for a microcomputer.
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